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Abstract
Cost asymmetry is generally thought to hinder collusion because a more e¢ -
cient rm has both more to gain from a deviation and less to fear from retaliation
than less e¢ cient rms. Our paper reexamines this conventional wisdom and char-
acterizes optimal collusion without any prior restriction on the class of strategies.
We rst stress that rms can credibly agree on retaliation schemes that maximally
punish even the most e¢ cient rm. This implies that whenever collusion is sustain-
able under cost symmetry, some collusion is also sustainable under cost asymmetry;
e¢ cient collusion, however, remains more di¢ cult to sustain when costs are asym-
metric. Finally, we show that, in the presence of side payments, cost asymmetry
generally facilitates collusion.
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1 Introduction
Economists and policy-makers generally agree that cost asymmetry hinders collusion.
In his classical industrial organization textbook for example, Scherer (1980) states that
"...the more cost functions di¤er from rm to rm, the more trouble rms will have
maintaining a common price policy". The US Merger Guidelines refer to some of the
underlying arguments for this conventional wisdom when stating that "...the extent of
homogeneity may be relevant both for the ability to reach terms of coordination and to
detect or punish deviations from those terms".
There are three main reasons why cost asymmetry is thought to hinder collusion.1
First, coordination problems are obviously more complex when rms have divergent pref-
erences concerning collusive prices and there are no natural focal points. Second, it may
be di¢ cult to convince an e¢ cient rm to join a cartel, since it may earn relatively high
prots even under competition. Third, cost asymmetry may also hinder the sustainability
of collusion, since (i) it may be more di¢ cult to retaliate against an e¢ cient rm in case
it deviates from the cartel agreement, and (ii) a more e¢ cient rm may gain relatively
more from deviating in the short-term.
This paper examines the sustainability of collusion in homogenous-good Bertrand
oligopoly supergames with discounting where rms face di¤erent unit costs. Our aim is
to analyze the maximum scope for collusion. Threats of severe retaliation against cheating
rms are clearly optimal for cartel stability, since they reduce deviation incentives and
thereby facilitate cooperation. Of course, punishment threats must be credible to be
e¤ective. We illustrate that there exist credible punishments that leave any cheating rm
with zero continuation prots. Hence, even if the deviator faces lower marginal production
costs than all other industry participants, the other rms can credibly force the deviator
down to minmax continuation prots. Thus, cost asymmetry weakens retaliation only if
there is some reason why rms should use standard trigger strategies or other restricted
forms of punishments instead of these maximal credible punishments.
This implies that a more e¢ cient rm does not necessarily have stronger incentives to
deviate from a collusive agreement than a less e¢ cient rm. Suppose, for instance, that
the industry is made up of two rms, and that the more e¢ cient rm has a non-drastic
cost advantage over the less e¢ cient rm. Consider a stationary collusive path on which
the price is equal to the low-cost rms monopoly price and rms split demand equally in
1See Ivaldi et al. (2003) for an overview of the di¤erent arguments.
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every period. The optimal one-shot deviation for each rm is then to slightly undercut
the collusive price so as to "steal" its rivals consumers, thereby doubling its prot in the
deviation period. The rmsrelative short-term deviation incentives are hence symmetric.
Therefore, when all punishments indeed minmax deviators, so that deviatorspunishment
prots are symmetric as well, the critical discount factor for this collusive scheme is 1
2
.
The discount factor threshold for some collusion is thus the same under cost asymmetry
as under cost symmetry.
This conclusion di¤ers from those in the previous literature that has focused on grim
trigger strategies. Bae (1987) as well as Harrington (1991), whose frameworks very closely
resemble ours, determine the set of prices and output quotas sustainable by standard grim
trigger strategies. Since the most e¢ cient rms punishment prot increases with the size
of its cost advantage in this case, cost asymmetry renders the deterrence of deviations
more di¢ cult. Cost asymmetry therefore hinders collusion sustained by standard grim
trigger strategies, even if allowing for ine¢ cient allocations from the viewpoint of the
cartel so as to render short-term deviation gains symmetric.
When the focus is on collusive allocations that are Pareto-e¢ cient for the cartel mem-
bers (in the absence of side payments), on the other hand, our qualitative results are in
line with the previous literature. Unless only the most e¢ cient rm produces, Pareto-
e¢ ciency for the rms requires a price above the most e¢ cient rms monopoly price. For
such prices, however, the most e¢ cient rm has a disproportionately high deviation gain:
it not only gains market share, but also switches to its prot-maximizing price. Firms
with higher monopoly prices have relatively less to gain from a deviation. Collusion on a
statically Pareto-e¢ cient allocation is thus more di¢ cult to sustain under cost asymmetry
than under cost symmetry.
This paper focuses on the sustainability of collusion rather than on how rms select
a specic equilibrium and coordinate on it. As is well known, repeated games generally
have a multitude of equilibria and there is no uncontested method to select one of them.
Firms may even be "locked" into a bad equilibrium in which some cartel members earn
less than in the absence of any collusion. Nonetheless, our analysis gives some guidance as
to which collusive equilibria rms may reasonably select, since we characterize the Pareto
frontier of the set of payo¤s attainable on stationary perfect equilibrium paths.2
2Schmalensee (1987) applies a variety of selection criteria to model the choice of price and output
quotas by an asymmetric cartel. His paper, however, does not examine explicitly whether a selected
outcome is also sustainable. Bae (1987) and Harrington (1991), on the other hand, analyze the selection
3
Another contribution of our paper is to analyze the role of side transfers. As Bain
(1948) argued more than 50 years ago, if rms have di¤erent marginal costs, the maxi-
mization of industry prots by a cartel requires side payments: without transfers, some
production must be allocated to high-cost rms to induce their compliance. While an-
titrust rules typically prohibit direct transfers, there is evidence that some (illegal) cartels
nevertheless use illegal payments. In the Florida bid rigging scheme for providing school
milk, for example, dairies used side payments to compensate cartel members for refraining
from bidding.3 In the worldwide lysine cartel, rms with realized market shares above
their allotments had to compensate the other rms through inter-rm sales.4 In the New
York trash haulers cartel, "[an] undercover police detective posing as a carting executive
paid more than $790,000 in "dues" to the [trash haulers] associations and in compensation
to other carters".5
Our analysis conrms that side payments facilitate collusion between asymmetric
rms; more surprisingly, it also shows that cost asymmetry generally facilitates collu-
sion when side payments are feasible. The latter result runs completely counter to the
conventional wisdom on the impact of cost asymmetries. Side transfers allow rms to
increase the total pie by allocating more production to the most e¢ cient rm without
inducing a deviation by a less e¢ cient rm. In a way, rms agree on a mutually benecial
scheme of compensation payments for being inactive.
While side transfers are typically ruled out in complete-information models of collusion
like ours, they play an important role in the existing literature on (explicit as well as
implicit) cartels between privately informed rms. The di¢ culty there is to induce rms to
truthfully report their potentially asymmetric costs so as to allocate production e¢ ciently.
In this context, side transfers - from the rm with the lowest reported cost to the other
cartel members - can be used as part of a mechanism to ensure truthtelling. However,
the early literature analyzing this idea (Roberts (1985), Cramton and Palfrey (1990),
Kihlstrom and Vives (1992) and McAfee and McMillan (1992)) does not model dynamics
of an allocation within the set of collusive outcomes sustainable by standard grim trigger strategies;
Bae uses the balanced temptation requirement of Friedman (1971), while Harrington (1991) applies the
more general Nash bargaining solution. Our analysis of the Pareto frontier of sustainable allocations
corresponds to the set of Nash bargaining solutions with minmax prots as threat points.
3See Pesendorfer (2000).
4See Hammond (2005). Similar compensation schemes were also employed in the citric acid cartel (see
European Commission (2001)), or the sodium gluconate cartel (see European Commission (2002)).
5See Porter (2005) for this citation from the New York Times, June 23, 1995.
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explicitly. More recently, Athey and Bagwell (2001, 2006) consider Bertrand supergames
in which rms receive privately observed cost shocks in every period. When rms cannot
make side transfers, future market share favors can then be used as a means of providing
thruthtelling incentives to rms with high cost realizations. As also shown by Athey and
Bagwell (2001), side transfers further help collusion by facilitating information revelation
and thus the e¢ cient allocation of production.
On the theoretical side, our paper also relates to the literature on collusion under
other forms of competition or cost asymmetry. In the existing literature on collusion
in asymmetric Cournot supergames, the authors often either choose to or are bound to
impose some restrictions on the strategies considered. Rothschild (1999) uses standard
grim trigger strategies, which again implies that more e¢ cient rms have less to fear from
retaliation than less e¢ cient cartel members. Vasconcelos (2005) looks for more general
punishments in the class of equilibria with proportional market shares on all equilibrium
paths; he shows that optimal punishments, with a stick-and-carrot structure as proposed
by Abreu (1986, 1988), exist within this restricted class of equilibria. For a limited range of
parameters, these punishments are also maximal and would thus be optimal even without
any restrictions.
In the related literature on collusion with asymmetric capacity constraints where rms
compete in prices, the characterization of optimal punishments is unfortunately quite
di¢ cult. While Lambson (1987) shows that optimal punishments exist in models with
symmetric capacity constraints, Lambson (1994) provides only a partial characterization
in the asymmetric case. The impact of asymmetry in capacities on collusive sustainability
was studied by Davidson and Deneckere (1990) in the context of standard grim trigger
strategies. Compte, Jenny and Rey (2002) extend this analysis and allow for harsher
punishments, but restrict attention to a particular class of equilibria where market shares
along any punishment path are the same as on the collusive path and the rmsprices
are symmetric on any equilibrium path. Dechenaux and Kovenock (2003) extend this
literature by allowing each (capacity constrained) rm to set in every period not only its
price but also the maximum quantity the rm is willing to sell at that price. In the thus
altered game, the authors construct credible stick-and-carrot punishments that improve
upon, in the sense of being more severe, the punishments applied in Lambson (1994)
as well as in Compte, Jenny and Rey (2002). Finally, Lambson (1995) allows for small
asymmetries in marginal costs as well as in capacity constraints and discount rates. In
this very general framework, he shows that if the game is nearly symmetric, then optimal
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punishments minmax deviators.
Our analysis proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets out the framework. Section 3 discusses
optimal punishments in models of repeated price setting when rms have asymmetric unit
costs. Section 4 deals with stationary collusion without side payments. We rst derive
the set of all sustainable collusive outcomes as a function of the discount factor. Next,
we restrict attention to Pareto-e¢ cient collusion. We also derive the Pareto frontier
of sustainable allocations, i.e. the Pareto-e¢ cient subset of the set of all sustainable
allocations. In section 5, which has the same structure as section 4, we allow for side
payments. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 Framework
We consider a simple model of innitely repeated Bertrand competition between n  2
rms indexed by i = 1; 2; :::; n. Entry by other rms is blockaded; it may, however, happen
that not all n rms indeed sell in equilibrium.6 Firms produce perfect substitutes, but
may face di¤erent constant marginal costs of production:
0 < c1  c2  :::  cn:
Aggregate demand for the rmsoutput as a function of the price p isD(p) : R+ ! R+.
We make the following assumptions:
A1 There exists a nite choke price p > cn such that D(p) > 0 if p < p, and D(p) = 0 if
p  p.
A2 D(p) is continuous and strictly decreasing on [0; p], and twice continuously di¤eren-
tiable on (0; p).
A3 For all i 2 f1; :::; ng, i(p)  (p  ci)D(p) is strictly concave on [ci; p].
For every rm i 2 f1; :::; ng, there then exists a unique monopoly price pmi 2 (ci; p)
that maximizes i(p). A standard argument ensures that pm1  pm2  :::  pmn . Unless
explicitly stated otherwise, we assume that the cost advantage of rm 1 compared to rm
2 is non-drastic:
pm1 > c2:
6The source of advantage of each of the n rms - whether it is actively selling or not - over outsiders
could for example be a patent or a licence that cannot be traded freely.
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In this set-up, we analyze the subgame perfect equilibria of the supergame obtained by
innitely repeating the stage game described next and discounting payo¤s with discount
factor  2 (0; 1).
In the stage game, rms simultaneously choose prices. We assume that no rm ever
sets a price outside of [0; p], and denote the vector of prices in period t = 0; 1; 2; ::: by
P t = (pt1; p
t
2; ::; p
t
n) 2 [0; p]n. In every period, the whole market demand goes to the lowest
priced rm(s). In case of a price tie at the lowest price, consumers are indi¤erent between
a number of sellers, and we will allow total demand to be split between the lowest priced
rms in any way consistent with the equilibrium (that is, no rm has an incentive to
deviate to a di¤erent price).7 We denote by n 1 the (n  1) dimensional unit simplex:
n 1 = f(s1; s2; :::; sn) 2 Rn j si  0 for all i,
Pn
i=1 si = 1g. The market sharing rule in
period t is then a mapping st() : Rn+ ! n 1 such that sti() = 0 if pti 6= minj2f1;ngfptjg.
In the innite horizon game obtained by repeating this price game, a path is an in-
nite sequence of actions fP tg1t=0. Given the sequence of market sharing rules fst()g1t=0,
rm is sum of discounted payo¤s from period s onwards along the path fP tg1t=0 isP1
t=s 
t ssti(P
t)i(p
t
i). A rms strategy
8 is an innite sequence of action functions, where
the period t action function maps from the set of possible histories of the game at time t,
[0; p]nt, into [0; p].
3 Minmax Punishments
For tacit collusion to be successful, rms need to agree on some credible retaliation mech-
anism to punish deviations. The scope for collusion is greatest if deviations from the
collusive agreement are punished as harshly as possible. By the same logic, it is easiest
to punish a rm if deviations from the prescribed punishment are retaliated against as
severely as possible.
The minmax of each rms prot is zero in our model: while a rm can always avoid
negative prots by charging a price above its marginal cost, any other rm can drive its
prots down to zero by undercutting its price. A security level punishment for rm i is
7In his closely related analysis, Harrington (1991) also assumed that demand is divided between the
lowest priced rms in any way consistent with the equilibrium. Bernheim and Whinston (1990, p. 4,
footnote 8) point out that a useful way to think about this is to imagine that products are almost perfectly
homogenous. For a su¢ ciently small degree of product di¤erentiation, prices can then be set at slightly
di¤erent levels so as to achieve any desired split of market demand with almost no e¤ect on prots.
8We restrict attention to pure strategies.
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thus a path with a continuation value of zero for rm i. Obviously, if rms are able to
credibly "collude" on punishment strategies such that any deviation by a particular rm
triggers a security level punishment for this rm (that is, if such punishment strategies can
arise as part of a perfect equilibrium of the supergame), then these punishment strategies
maximize the scope for collusion, and the optimal penal code is a security level penal
code.9
We will now argue that there indeed exists a security level penal code for any  2 (0; 1)
in the game considered here. The focus will be on trigger strategy proles generating
punishment paths that consist of a constant sequence of some static Bertrand-Nash equi-
librium (where the selection of the static equilibrium may depend on the identity of the
deviator).
If c1 = c2  :::  cn, it is easy to punish any deviator down to minmax continuation
prots by means of standard Nash reversion: rms can simply agree to revert upon any
deviation to the one-shot Bertrand equilibrium in which each rm i sets price ci, and all
rms earn zero prots.10
If c1 < c2  :::  cn, then there is a continuum of Bertrand equilibria in the underlying
stage game. Consider any price p1 2 [c1; c2]. With any market sharing rule that assigns
all the demand to rm 1 if it is one of the lowest priced rms (at price p1), the following is
a one-shot Bertrand equilibrium: rm 1 posts price p1, rm 2 posts price p1, and any rm
i 2 f3; :::; ng posts price ci.11 Firm 1s equilibrium prot is 1 (p1) 2 [0; 1 (c2)]. There
hence always exists a static equilibrium in which rm 1 earns minmax prots.
Now consider the following trigger punishments:
 any deviation by rm 1 triggers reversion to the one-shot Bertrand equilibrium
described above in which consumers pay c1; formally, in every period from the rst
period after the deviation onwards the price vector is (c1; c1; c3; :::; cn) and the vector
of market shares is (1; 0; :::; 0).
9We focus on punishment strategy proles such that any deviation by a particular rm, be it from
collusion or from a punishment already in play, triggers the start of the same (rm-specic) punishment
path. Abreu (1988) shows that this focus on simple penal codes does not imply any loss of generality. If
several rms deviate simultaneously, no punishment is started.
10Any market sharing rule is consistent with this static equilibrium.
11Note also that if we allow for mixed strategies, then any price between c1 and c2 can be supported
in equilibrium without making appeal to a market sharing rule favoring rm 1. In such equilibria, rm
2 randomizes in a neighbourhood above the equilibrium market price p1 while rm 1 continues to play a
pure strategy. See Deneckere and Kovenock (1989 and 1996, footnote 10) and Blume (2003).
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 any deviation by a rm i 6= 1 triggers reversion to the one-shot Bertrand equilibrium
decribed above in which consumers pay c2; formally, in every period from the rst
period after the deviation onwards the price vector is (c2; c2; c3; :::; cn) and the vector
of market shares is (1; 0; :::; 0).
Clearly, these are security level punishments. Moreover, it is trivial that no rm has an
incentive to deviate from any of these punishments: no rm can make a short-term gain
by deviating from a static equilibrium, but a deviation starts a security level punishment
for the deviator.
Even if c1 < c2, an optimal penal code thus prescribes security level punishments for
all rms, including rm 1. This means that the conventional wisdom that retaliation
against an e¢ cient rm is di¢ cult hinges upon the use of non-optimal punishments. In
particular, standard trigger strategies, where a deviation by any rm, including the most
e¢ cient one, triggers reversion to the one-shot equilibrium with price c2, do not punish
all rms as severely as possible.
Discussion Whenever c1 < c2, then the punishment for rm 1 proposed here has a
characteristic that some readers may nd unattractive: in every period, rm 2 plays
a weakly dominated strategy in the one-shot game.12 Indeed, in the stage game we
consider it is common to rule out all the one-shot equilibria with prices strictly below c2 as
implausible, since such equilibria cannot be obtained as limits of equilibria in undominated
strategies in discrete approximations to the game with a continuous strategy space.13 Two
remarks are in order. First, as long as n > 2, all that is needed for a static equilibrium
that minmaxes rm 1 is for one of the other rms to charge c1. The other n  2 rms can
charge whatever prices they want, for instance their monopoly prices. This implies that
by rotating the identity of the rm holding rm 1 down, the punishing rms can engage
in a "stationary" policy that does not have any single punishing rm playing a weakly
dominated strategy in the one-shot game in every period.14 Second, for n = 2, it is easy
to design an optimal penal code in which deviations by rm 1 trigger a stick-and-carrot
12Note that by setting c1, rm 1 plays a weakly dominated strategy in the one-shot game as well; how-
ever, rm 1s strategy can be obtained as the limit of undominated strategies in discrete approximations
to the game, whereas rm 2s strategy cannot. Similarly, if c1 = c2, the the one-shot Bertrand equilibrium
involves the play of weakly dominated strategies, but these are again limits of undominated strategies of
nite strategy space games.
13See Deneckere and Kovenock (1996, footnote 8).
14I am grateful to the editor Dan Kovenock for this suggestion.
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punishment à la Abreu (1986, 1988), provided that the discount factor is su¢ ciently high
for some collusion to be sustainable and thus serve as a carrot; see proposition A1 in the
appendix for a proof of this in the general case with n rms. Firm 2 then charges a price
below c2 only during the initial stick phase of rm 1s punishment.
4 Collusion without Side Payments
4.1 Sustainability
We dene a stationary collusive outcome by a vector (p; s), where p 2 (c2; p) is the market
price, i.e. the lowest price quoted by any of the rms, and s = (s1; :::; sn) 2 n 1 is the
associated vector of market shares. In this section, we characterize the set of all stationary
collusive outcomes that are sustainable in a subgame perfect equilibrium.15 An outcome
is sustainable if and only if it can be supported by an optimal penal code, which, as shown
in the previous section, is a security level penal code in the game considered.
Note rst that no sustainable stationary collusive scheme can ever assign a positive
market share to a rm whose cost is above the collusive price p; otherwise, such a rm
would make negative prots by sticking to collusion, whereas it could ensure zero contin-
uation prots by deviating to a higher price, even if the ensuing punishment is maximal.
We therefore dene the set of "active rms" by16
A(p) = fi j ci < pg:
15Proposition A2 in the appendix shows that if no stationary outcome with a price strictly above c2
can be supported in a subgame perfect equilibrium, then on any equilibrium path rm 1s nomalized
discounted payo¤ lies in [0; 1 (c2)] and any rm i 6= 1s payo¤ is zero. As argued in section 3, any of
these payo¤ proles can also be supported on a stationary path for all  2 (0; 1). If the discount factor
is so low that no stationary paths with p > c2 is sustainable, the stationarity restriction is hence without
loss of generality. Therefore, the stationarity assumption does not drive the results of our comparison of
the critical discount factors for some collusion under cost symmetry and under cost asymmetry. The sta-
tionarity restriction may imply a loss of generality for higher discount factors however; see the discussion
concluding section 4.2.2.
16If ci = p and si > 0 under collusion, rm is non-deviation constraint would be satised trivially,
since both its collusive and its deviation prots would be zero. Granting a positive market share to rm
i would then hinder collusion in the sense that some other rms market share would need to be reduced.
We therefore restrict the set of active rms to those with marginal costs strictly below the collusive price.
This assumption will simplify the exposition, but does not inuence the critical discount factor.
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Inactive rms can be thought of as potential entrants. Formally, since "exit" is not part
of a rms set of actions, we specify that each inactive rm i sets pmi in every period
along the collusive path. Our focus is then on paths such that in every period t, pti = p
if i 2 A(p) and pti = pmi if i =2 A(p).17 The associated sequence of market sharing rules
results in market shares st = s 2 n 1 in all time periods t where obviously si = 0 if
i =2 A(p).
Sustainability of collusion then boils down to the requirement that none of the active
rms has an incentive to deviate from the collusive outcome. The optimal one-shot
deviation18 for a rm i 2 A(p) is to charge pmi if the collusive price lies above pmi , and to
slightly undercut its rivalsprice otherwise. The non-deviation constraint of any active
rm i 2 A(p) is hence
1
1   sii(p)  i (min[p; p
m
i ]) . (Ci)
A collusive outcome (p; s) is sustainable if and only if it satises conditions (Ci) for all
i 2 A(p). We denote the set of all sustainable stationary collusive outcomes as a function
of the discount factor by  ():
 ()  (p; s) 2 (c2; p)n 1 j (Ci) holds for all i 2 A(p), si = 0 for all i =2 A(p)	 (1)
Adding up the non-deviation conditions (Ci) of all active rms, using the fact that their
market shares must add up to one, yields the following necessary condition for collusion
at price p:
  e(p); (2)
where
e(p)  Pi2A(p) i(min[p;pmi ])i(p)   1P
i2A(p)
i(min[p;pmi ])
i(p)
: (3)
It is easy to see this condition on the price is not only necessary but also su¢ cient:
whenever (2) is satised, there exists a vector of market shares s such that the non-
deviation conditions (Ci) hold for all active rms.
17Given stationarity, the assumption that all active rms indeed quote the market price p does not
restrict the analysis of sustainability. If a stationary outcome at which some rm j 2 A(p) sets a price
pj > p (and thus has a market share sj = 0) is sustainable, then an otherwise indentical outcome with
pj = p and sj = 0 is also sustainable: the rmscollusive prots are identical in the two scenarios, and
the scope for deviations is either the same or less if rm j sets p instead of some higher price.
18By the one-shot deviation principle, a "strategy prole is subgame perfect if and only if there are no
protable one-shot deviations" (proposition 2.2.1 in Mailath and Samuelson (2006), p. 30). It is hence
su¢ cient to consider one-shot deviations.
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We denote the number of active rms, that is of elements in A(p), by m(p) 2 [2; n].
Clearly, m(p) is (weakly) increasing: as the collusive price rises, more rms could prof-
itably undercut p and must therefore join the collusive agreement for it to remain sus-
tained.
For collusive prices p 2 (c2; pm1 ], the critical discount factor is e(p) = m(p) 1m(p) , which is
also the threshold for collusion between m(p) symmetric rms. This result arises because
in this case each active rms optimal deviation would consist in slightly undercutting
its rival, and all rmspunishments impose zero continuation prots. Each active car-
tel members deviation incentives then only depend on its market share relative to the
discount factor, and the non-deviation constraint for any i 2 A(p) is simply
si  1  . (C 0i)
Note that even for prices below the most e¢ cient rms monopoly price, the critical
discount factor may exhibit upward jumps if the number of active rms m(p) increases,
so that the market must be shared by a larger number of rms to preserve collusion.
Suppose for example that n = 3, and c2 < c3 < pm1 . Then the critical discount factor e(p)
is 1
2
for p 2 (c2; c3], but e(p) = 23 for p 2 (c3; pm1 ]. For p 2 (c2; pm1 ], e(p) is hence weakly
increasing.
For p > pm1 , on the other hand, the discount factor threshold e(p) is strictly increas-
ing even if the number of active rms remains constant. This result is driven by the
wedge between a rms stand-alone collusive prots i(p) and its deviation prots i(pmi )
whenever p > pmi . Given any market sharing rule, rm is incentive to deviate is then
clearly higher the larger the (positive) di¤erence between the collusive price and its own
monopoly price. For p > pm1 , this di¤erence is positive for at least the most e¢ cient rm
1, which drives up the critical discount factor. If the collusive price exceeds the monopoly
prices of several rms, this e¤ect is further reinforced.
The critical discount factor is thus increasing in p for two reasons: (i) a price increase
may attract "entry", which in turn forces rms to share the market with more rms in
order to preserve collusion, and (ii) by creating or increasing the wedge between stand-
alone collusive prots and short-term deviation prots, higher prices may increase the
deviation incentives of already active rms. Note that limp!pe(p) = 1.
The minimum market share that must be granted to an active rm i 2 A(p) such that
collusion at price p 2 (c2; p) is indeed sustainable for some discount factor   e(p) is
esi(p; )  (1  )i (min[p; pmi ])
i(p)
:
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This lower bound esi(p; ) is such that (Ci) is binding. Moreover, each rms market
share is restricted upwards by the other rmsnon-deviation constraints. In particular,
the maximum market share that can possibly be granted to rm i without triggering a
deviation by some other rm is 1  Pj2A(p)i esj(p; ). For p 2 (c2; pm1 ], when the non-
deviation constraints are independent of the collusive price, market shares are restricted by
si2A(p) 2 [1 ; 1  (m(p) 1)(1 )] and
P
i2A(p) si = 1, as under cost symmetry between
m(p) rms. For prices above pmi , the lower bound on rm is market share, esi(p; ), strictly
increases with the price to accommodate is increasing deviation incentives.
The set of all sustainable allocations as a function of the discount factor can then be
expressed as follows:
 () =
8<: (p; s) 2 (c2; p)n 1 j e(p)  , si = 0 for all i =2 A(p),si 2 hesi(p; ); 1 Pj2A(p)i esj(p; )i for all i 2 A(p)
9=; : (4)
The impact of the discount factor on the size of the set  () is as follows. First, since
@e(p)
@p
 0 as explained above, the set of prices satisfying e(p)   (weakly) increases with
. Second, @esi(p;)
@
< 0, which implies for any given sustainable price the set of possible
collusive market shares expands as the discount factor rises.
Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of  () when n = 2. In this case, (p; s1)
fully denes an outcome, with the understanding that s2 = 1   s1. For  below 12 , the
discount factor threshold under cost symmetry, no collusion is sustainable:  () = ? if
 < 1
2
. For  = 1
2
, the set of sustainable outcomes consists of all allocations such that
p 2 (c2; pm1 ] and s1 = 12 . As under cost symmetry, only equal market sharing rules are
sustainable at the critical discount factor 1
2
. For higher discount factors, prices above pm1
and asymmetric market sharing rules are sustainable as well. This is illustrated in Figure
1 for some 0 2 (1
2
;e(pm2 )]. The set of sustainable allocations (0) includes all outcomes
in the striped region, that is, all allocations that are (i) left of or on the line labelled
C2(
0), along which rm 2 is indi¤erent between complying and deviating, and (ii) right
of or on the line labelled C1(
0), along which rm 1 is indi¤erent between deviating and
complying. Both non-deviation constraints are binding at the maximal collusive price,
which is denoted by p0 in the gure. Note that since e(p) is strictly increasing for p > pm1 ,
the highest sustainable price p0 is uniquely dened by the condition e(p0) = 0.
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Figure 1: Sustainable Collusive Outcomes without Side Payments (n = 2)
4.2 Pareto-E¢ cient Collusion
The previous section provided a complete characterization of the set of sustainable sta-
tionary collusive outcomes. It is clear, however, that an outcome that is sustainable may
fail to be optimal in the sense that the rms could achieve a Pareto-improvement by
moving to another sustainable outcome.
In this section, we incorporate the concern of Pareto-e¢ ciency (for the rms) into
the analysis. For simplicity, we restrict attention to an industry with only two rms,
i.e. n = 2, for the whole section. The analysis will consist of two main parts. First, we
derive the set of allocations that are Pareto-e¢ cient for the rms in the stage game. We
show that the critical discount factor for stationary collusion on one of these allocations
is higher when rms are asymmetric than when they are symmetric. Second, we analyze
the Pareto-e¢ cient subset of the set of sustainable stationary outcomes.
4.2.1 Stationary Collusion on Pareto-E¢ cient Outcomes
Let us rst analyze the Pareto-optimal allocation of production between two rms with
strictly asymmetric marginal costs, ignoring the issue of collusive sustainability.
Solving the following problem for every  2 [0; 1] yields a simple characterization of
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all Pareto-e¢ cient outcomes for the rms:19
max
fp;s1g
[s11(p)]
 [(1  s1)2(p)]1  : (P1)
The solution for each  is such that
s1 = ; (5)
and that the two rmsiso-prot lines are tangent:
 s1
0
1(p)
1(p)
= (1  s1)
0
2(p)
2(p)
: (6)
As  varies between 0 and 1, the optimal market sharing rule s1 varies between 0 and 1,
and the optimal price varies between pm2 and p
m
1 .
Solving (6) for s1 yields the following one-to-one correspondence:
sO(p) =
(c2   c1)D(p) + (p  c2)01(p)
(c2   c1)D(p) : (7)
As can be easily seen from (6), sO(pm1 ) = 1, s
O(pm2 ) = 0 and
@sO
@p
(p) < 0 for all p 2 [pm1 ; pm2 ].
The inverse function of sO : [pm1 ; p
m
2 ] ! [0; 1] will be denoted by pO : [0; 1] ! [pm1 ; pm2 ].
The set of Pareto-e¢ cient outcomes can then be dened as follows:
PO  (p; s) 2 (c2; p)1 j p = pO(s1)	 : (8)
Next, let us check for which discount factors the intersection between the set of Pareto-
e¢ cient allocations, PO, and the set of sustainable allocations, (), is non-empty.
Proposition 1 Let n = 2 and c1 < c2. Then, there exists a discount factor thresholdb > 1
2
such that
  () \ PO = ? if and only if  < b, and
 for   b, there exists a market share threshold bs1 () 2 (1  ; ] such that all
outcomes
 
pO(s1); s1; 1  s1

with s1 2 [bs1 () ; ] are both Pareto-e¢ cient and sus-
tainable, i.e. are elements of  () \ PO.
Figure 2 illustrates the results of Proposition 1 in the space (s1; p), with the under-
standing that s2 = 1   s1. For  = b, the unique allocation in the intersection between
 () and PO has p = pO
b and s1 = b. For 0 > b, all allocations such that p = pO (s1)
19See exercise 6.1 in Tirole (1988) for a detailed treatment of an equivalent problem.
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and s1 2 [bs1 (0) ; 0] are both Pareto-e¢ cient and sustainable. Note also that bs1 (0) is the
lowest market share s1 for which, given the discount factor 
0, rm 1 is willing to go along
with collusion at price pO (s1).
The result that b > 1
2
is intuitive. For any outcome (p; s) 2 (c2; p)  1 to be
sustainable, it is necessary that s1 < 1, otherwise rm 2 could protably deviate. If
s1 < 1, however, then Pareto-e¢ ciency for the rms requires that p > pm1 . This in turn
implies that for rm 1, the short-term deviation prot 1(pm1 ) strictly exceeds the stand-
alone collusive prot 1(p). To render deviations unprotable for the low-cost rm, it is
therefore necessary that its collusive market share s1 strictly exceeds 1  :
s1 > 1  : (9)
Moreover, to rule out protable deviations of the the high-cost rm, it is necessary that
1  s1  1  : (10)
Adding up (9) and (10) yields  > 1
2
.
The comparison with the situation in which costs are symmetric is straightforward.
If c1 = c2, then any allocation such that p = pm1 is Pareto-e¢ cient for the rms. The
discount factor threshold for some e¢ cient collusion is hence 1
2
: collusion at the common
monopoly price is possible for any discount factor larger than or equal to this threshold
if the rms split the market evenly, i.e. if s1 = 12 . Thus, it is more di¢ cult to sustain
e¢ cient collusion if costs are asymmetric than if costs are symmetric.
4.2.2 The Pareto Frontier of Sustainable Outcomes
We now analyze the Pareto-e¢ cient subset of the set of sustainable stationary outcomes
for each discount factor, still restricting attention to the case n = 2. This approach takes
account of the methodological point, underlined by Harrington (1991), that an allocation
only provides a sensible collusive outcome if it is indeed implementable by a self-enforcing
agreement. By restricting attention to the set of sustainable collusive equilibria a priori,
the rms automatically solve this implementation problem.
Proposition 2 Let n = 2 and c1 < c2. Then, the Pareto-e¢ cient subset of the set of
sustainable stationary collusive outcomes is

() =  () \ PO [ (p; s1; 1  s1) j s1 = ; p 2 pm1 ; pO()	 :
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Figure 2: E¢ cient Stationary Collusion
Constrained Pareto-optimal outcomes thus either lie on rm 2s non-deviation con-
straint or/and are unconstrained Pareto optima. In the former case, prices lie between
rm 1s monopoly price and pO(). Figure 3 illustrates the sets of Pareto-undominated
sustainable allocations for two di¤erent discount factors, 1 and 2, one below and one
above b.
It is easy to understand the intuition behind these results graphically. First note that
any allocation (p; s) 2  () with p < pm1 is Pareto dominated by the allocation (pm1 ; s),
which is also included in  (); similarly, any allocation (p; s) 2  () with p > pm2 is
Pareto dominated by the allocation (pm2 ; s) 2  (). Therefore, we can restrict attention
to sustainable allocations with p 2 [pm1 ; pm2 ]. For such prices, rm 1s iso-prot lines in the
(s1; p) space are strictly increasing and concave; in fact, for p  pm1 , the iso-prot curve for
prot level (1  )1(pm1 ) coincides with C1(). Firm 1s payo¤ increases in the southeast
direction, as rm 1 prefers a higher market share s1 and prices closer to its own monopoly
price. For prices below pm2 , rm 2s iso-prot lines in the (s1; p) space are increasing and
convex. For allocations with p < pO(s1) they are atter than, for allocations such that
p = pO(s1) tangent to, and for allocations such that p > pO(s1) steeper than the iso-prot
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Figure 3: The Pareto Frontier of Sustainable Allocations
lines of rm 1. Moreover, rm 2s payo¤ increases in the northwest direction: rm 2
prefers a higher market share s2 = 1  s1 and prices closer to pm2 .
Having said this, it is straightforward to exclude sustainable allocations with p >
pO(s1) from any 
 (): moving along rm 1s iso-prot curve towards pO(s1) always
increases rm 2s prots without hindering collusive sustainability. Now consider any
allocation where p < pO(s). If rms are able to move northeast along rm 1s iso-prot
line without violating sustainability, a Pareto improvement within  () is attainable: the
high-cost rm is strictly better o¤ thanks to the price increase although its market share
(1  s1) is lower. The only sustainable allocations with p < pO(s1) that are undominated
are then those for which the high-cost rms non-deviation constraint is binding, i.e.
s1 = , so that no further northeast moves are feasible. Finally, unconstrained Pareto
optimal allocations are obviously undominated if sustainable. For   b, the set of Pareto
undominated sustainable allocations therefore always includes part of the set PO.
Finally, note that for su¢ ciently high discount factors, there can exist subgame perfect
equilibria with non-stationary paths that Pareto-dominate (for the rms) allocations in

(). While a full analysis of collusion on non-stationary paths is beyond the scope of
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this paper, let us illustrate this point by means of an example.
In the case of two rms, consider the following collusive outcome: the rms set pm1
in even periods and pm2 in odd periods, and rm i makes all the sales in periods with
price pmi . Starting from t = 0, rm 1s average discounted payo¤ is
1
1+
1(p
m
1 ) and rm
2s average discounted payo¤ is 
1+
2(p
m
2 ). As can be easily checked, if  =
3
4
, then this
agreement is sustainable,20 and the rmsaverage discounted payo¤s are 4
7
1(p
m
1 ) and
3
7
2(p
m
2 ), respectively.
It is also easy to check that
 
pO
 
4
7

; 4
7
; 3
7
 2 
(3
4
) whenever 1
 
pO
 
4
7
  7
16
1 (p
m
1 ).
Suppose that this is indeed the case. Then, the allocation
 
pO
 
4
7

; 4
7
; 3
7

belongs to 
(3
4
)
but the agreement with alternating monopolies described above is also sustainable and
yields higher discounted payo¤s for both rms.
The stationarity assumption hence restricts the scope of the analysis of e¢ cient collu-
sion. It does not, however, drive our results when comparing the discount factor thresholds
for some collusion under cost symmetry and under cost asymmetry, nor does it drive our
basic points concerning the collusion facilitating impact of side payments in the presence
of cost asymmetry; see proposition A2 in the appendix and its discussion in footnote 16.
5 Collusion with Side Payments
Side payments are often ruled out in the literature on collusion,21 since antitrust law
forbids overt monetary transfers in most jurisdictions. Nonetheless, as shown by the
examples in the introduction, cartel agreements sometimes include side payments. In the
following analysis, there are no restrictions at all on side payments. This is clearly an
extreme case that does not reect reality, yet it allows us to identify the mechanism by
which cost asymmetry a¤ects cartel sustainability when side payments are feasible. The
main qualitative insight will carry over if the extent of side payments is limited.
5.1 Sustainability
We now consider an innitely repeated interaction based on the following extensive form
stage game. At the beginning of each period, the rms simultaneously quote prices. Then,
20The critical discount factor is
p
5 1
2 .
21Exceptions include Jehiel (1992), as well as articles on collusion between privately informed rms
such as Athey and Bagwell (2001).
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the lowest priced rm(s) serve(s) the entire demand. Finally, every rm with (strictly)
positive sales unilaterally decides how much money to transfer to each of the other rms.
We can restrict attention to collusive outcomes such that rm 1 carries out all the
production in every period: letting any other rm produce a positive quantity would
not alter deviation prots, but lower (or at best leave unchanged if several rms have
marginal cost c1) total collusive prots, which can be shared by means of side payments.
We then dene a stationary collusive outcome with side payments by a vector (p; S),
where p 2 (c2; p) is the collusive market price and S = (S1; S2; :::; Sn) 2 n 1 is the
vector of prot shares. In every period, all rms quote price p, rm 1 serves the entire
demand D (p), and nally pays Si1(p) to each rm i 6= 1.
Note that rm 1 has no reason to make positive side payments to rms with marginal
costs above (or equal to) p, since those rms cannot credibly threaten to undercut the col-
lusive price. Hence, only rms that belong to the previously dened set A(p) = fi j ci < pg
need to receive positive transfers to prevent deviations: Si = 0 for all i =2 A(p).22
As shown in section 3, a security level penal code exists for any  2 (0; 1) in the absence
of side payments. Since rms cannot be punished more severely than that in the periods
following a deviation, there is no point in introducing side payments on punishment paths.
Firm 1s optimal one-shot deviation from the collusive outcome is to charge min[p; pm1 ]
and refuse all side payments. The low-cost rms non-deviation constraint is thus
1 (min[p; p
m
1 ]) 
1
1  S11(p): (D1)
The optimal one-shot deviation of any rm i 2 A(p) n 1 would be to slightly undercut
p if p  pmi , or to charge pmi otherwise.23 Such a deviation would not only trigger the start
of is punishment in the next period, but also make i lose the side payment from rm 1
22As in the analysis without side payments, we could speciy that on the collusive path pti = p
m
i for
all t if i =2 A(p). This would not a¤ect our results.
23It is obvious that the deviator has no incentive to make side payments.
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in the deviation period.24 The non-deviation constraint of any rm i 2 A(p) n 1 is hence
i (min[p; p
m
i ]) 
1
1  Si1(p): (Di)
A collusive outcome (p; S) is then sustainable if and only if conditions (Di) are satised
for all rms i 2 A(p), and Si = 0 for all i =2 A(p). The implied necessary and su¢ cient
condition on the discount factor for collusion at price p is:
  eT (p);
where eT (p)  Pi2A(p) i(min[p;pmi ])1(p)   1P
i2A(p)
i(min[p;pmi ])
1(p)
: (11)
The following proposition compares the critical discount factor for collusion with side
payments to the critical discount factor for collusion without side payments.
Proposition 3 Consider any p 2 (c2; p). Then, the critical discount factors eT (p) dened
in (11) and e(p) dened in (3) may be ranked as follows:
 If ci > c1 for some i 2 A(p), then eT (p) < e(p).
 If ci = c1 for all i 2 A(p), then eT (p) = e(p).
These results are intuitive. First, if all active rms have symmetric marginal costs (and
there are no xed costs), then no advantage can be derived from allocating production.
Whether all the production is carried out by rm 1 and each rm i 2 A(p) then receives a
share Si of 1 (p), or each rm i 2 A(p) produces and sells a share si = Si of total output
D(p) makes no di¤erence for the active rmscollusive or deviation prots. Hence, the
feasibility of side payments is irrelevant.
If the active rms have asymmetric costs, side payments facilitate collusion. This is
true because any rm i 2 A(p) with ci > c1 has less to gain when deviating from the
24Since we assume that only rm(s) with positive sales can make side payments, we automatically
obtain a kind of "within period" punishment: whenever rm 1 is undercut by a deviator, it reneges on
its side payments. If instead rm 1 could make side payments even after being undercut, an optimal
punishment code would need to have the following feature: If on the collusive path rm 1 reneges on its
side payment after observing a deviation by a rm i 6= 1, then this will not trigger rm 1s punishment
but rm is. It would then be optimal for rm 1 to indeed refuse side payments after a deviation by any
other rm.
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collusive outcome (p; S) than when deviating under collusion without side payments from
an outcome with the same price p and s = S. In the presence of side payments, compliance
permits a less e¢ cient rm to benet from the cost advantage of rm 1, while the rm
would have to rely on its own inferior production technology when deviating.
It is worth noting that the threshold eT (p) is increasing for all p 2 (c2; p). For p < pm1 ,
a price reduction alleviates the non-deviation constraints of active rms with marginal
costs above c1.25 In fact, if c1 < c2, then eT (p) ! 0 as p ! c2, so that some collusion is
sustainable for any  > 0. For p > pm1 , a price rise increases the deviation incentives of
all active rms: i(min[p;p
m
i ])
1(p)
is increasing in p for all i 2 A(p) in this case. Finally, for all
p 2 (c2; p), a price increase may lead to a rise in the number of active rms, which clearly
raises the critical discount factor.
Figure 4 illustrates the set of sustainable outcomes for some discount factor 0 2eT (pm1 );eT (pm2 ) if n = 2 and c1 < c2. Since n = 2, the vector (p; S1) fully denes a
collusive outcome. The set of sustainable outcomes for discount factor 0 then includes all
(p; S1) that are (i) on or right of the line labelled D1 (
0) along which rm 1 is indi¤erent
between complying and deviating, and (ii) on or left of the line labelled D2 (
0) along
which rm 2 is indi¤erent between complying and deviating. Note that D2 (
0) lies to the
right of the line dened by S1 = 
0: the less e¢ cient rm is willing to comply even if its
prots share 1  S1 is less than 1  0 because compliance allows the rm to benet from
rm 1s cost advantage.
As already noted by Bernheim and Whinston (1990), this is related to collusion under
multi-market contact. When each rm has a marginal cost advantage in one market,
multi-market contact facilitates collusion: by shifting sales towards the most e¢ cient
rm in each market, collusive prots go up, and the gains from deviating fall. A similar
mechanism is at work here: side payments allow a shift of sales to the most e¢ cient rm,
which raises collusive prots and decreases the deviation gains of less e¢ cient rms.
5.2 Pareto-E¢ cient Collusion with Side Payments
5.2.1 Collusion on Pareto-E¢ cient Outcomes
With side payments, any collusive outcome such that p = pm1 and rm 1 carries out all
the production is e¢ cient, since rms cannot jointly gain by either changing the price
or reallocating production. The unconstrained Pareto prot frontier thus consists of all
25It is easy to check that if ci > c1, then
i(min[p;p
m
i ])
1(p)
is strictly increasing in p for all p 2 (c2; p).
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Figure 4: Sustainable Collusive Ouctomes with Side Payments
possible divisions of 1 (pm1 ). The critical discount factor for collusion on a Pareto-e¢ cient
outcome with side payments is simply equal to eT (pm1 ).
Under cost asymmetry, more precisely if ci > c1 for some i 2 A (pm1 ), eT (pm1 ) lies strictly
below the critical discount factor for collusion on a Pareto-e¢ cient outcome without side
payments. First, by Proposition 3, if ci > c1 for some i 2 A (pm1 ), then eT (pm1 ) < e(pm1 ).
Second, without side payments, for a statically Pareto-e¢ cient outcome to be sustainable,
it is necessary that the price exceeds pm1 .
26 This implies that the discount factor threshold
for e¢ cient collusion without side payments lies strictly above e(pm1 ), which, as just argued,
already exceeds eT (pm1 ).
Proposition 3 also implies that if ci > c1 for some i 2 A (pm1 ), then eT (pm1 ) < e(pm1 ) =
m(pm1 ) 1
m(pm1 )
. This means that eT (pm1 ) is smaller than the threshold for e¢ cient collusion, that
is, collusion on the common monopoly price, between m (pm1 ) symmetric rms.
Consider n = 2 for example. If c1 = c2, the critical discount factor for e¢ cient collusion
26Without side payments, any statically Pareto-e¢ cient outcome with price pm1 must assign si = 0 to
rm i if ci > c1. This means that any rm i 2 A (pm1 ) with ci > c1 could protably deviate from such
an outcome. All other Pareto-e¢ cient outcomes must involve prices strictly above pm1 : if the price were
below pm1 , all rms could gain from moving to an outcome with the same market shares but price p
m
1 .
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is 1
2
. If c1 < c2, the critical discount factor for collusion on a Pareto-e¢ cient allocation
lies strictly below 1
2
if side payments are feasible, but strictly above 1
2
if side payments
are impossible (see also Proposition 1).
Finally, note that the comparison between the critical discount factors for e¢ cient col-
lusion with side payments under cost symmetry and under cost asymmetry would be less
straightforward if rms used "standard" trigger strategies instead of optimal punishments.
Cost asymmetry would have two countervailing e¤ects in that case: on the one hand, it
would increase the punishment payo¤ of the most e¢ cient rm and thereby hinders collu-
sion, but on the other hand, since side payments are feasible, cost asymmetry would tend
to facilitate collusion by alleviating the ine¢ cient rmsnon-deviation constraints.
5.2.2 The Pareto Frontier of Sustainable Outcomes
We now analyze the Pareto-e¢ cient subset of the set of sustainable outcomes with side
payments. For simplicity, we restrict attention to n = 2, as in the corresponding analysis
without side payments. The set of unconstrained Pareto-e¢ cient outcomes then consists
of all (p; S) 2 (c2; p)  1 such that p = pm1 . Obviously, if any unconstrained e¢ cient
outcome is sustainable, then this outcome is also part of the Pareto-e¢ cient subset of the
set of sustainable outcomes. As the following proposition shows, the constrained Pareto
frontier moreover always includes one or several outcomes such that rm 2s non-deviation
constraint is binding and the price lies strictly below pm1 .
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Proposition 4 Let n = 2 and c1 < c2. For every , dene pU () as the highest sustain-
able price, uniquely dened by the implicit condition eT  pU () = . Moreover, assume
that 2 [D0 (p)]2 > D(p)D00(p) for p 2 (c2; pm1 ). There then exists, for every , a unique
price pL () 2 [c2; pm1 ) such that the following statements are true.
 If   eT (pm1 ), then the Pareto-e¢ cient subset of the set of sustainable stationary
collusive outcomes with side payments is equal to

T () =

(p; S1; 1  S1) j p = pm1 ; S1 2

1  ; 1  (1  ) 2 (p)
1 (p)

[

(p; S) 2 (c2; p)1 j p 2

pL () ; pm1

; S1 = 1  (1  ) 2 (p)
1 (p)

:
27To show that this is true, we do not need the assumption 2 [D0 (p)]2 > D(p)D00(p) made in proposition
4. The role of this assumption is to guarantee the existence of a unique threshold pL () as characterized
in the proposition.
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 If  < eT (pm1 ), then the Pareto-e¢ cient subset of the set of sustainable stationary
collusive outcomes with side payments is equal to

T ()=

(p; S) 2 (c2; p)1 j p 2

min

pL () ; pU()
	
; pU()

; S1 = 1  (1  ) 2 (p)
1 (p)

:
Figure 4 illustrates the Pareto-e¢ cient subset of the set of sustainable collusive out-
comes for some discount factor 0 > eT (pm1 ). Why are outcomes with prices strictly below
pm1 part of the constrained Pareto frontier? This is because rm 1s preferred sustainable
outcome is not the e¢ cient outcome at price pm1 for which S1 is as large as possible with-
out provoking a deviation by rm 2. In fact, rm 1 prefers to move to a price strictly
below pm1 : a marginal move has a negative second-order e¤ect on 1(p
m
1 ), but this e¤ect
can be more than o¤set by a positive rst-order e¤ect on S1, since the price reduction
alleviates rm 2s no-deviation constraint. The shapes of the constrained Pareto fron-
tiers with and without side payments thus bear some resemblance. In both cases, the
constrained Pareto frontier consists (i) of all unconstrained Pareto-e¢ cient outcomes that
are sustainable, and (ii) of some outcomes at which rm 1s market (respectively, prot)
share is as large as possible given the price and the discount factor, and the price lies
below the Pareto-e¢ cient level (pO() or pm1 , respectively).
6 Concluding Remarks
By using optimal punishments and allowing for side payments, this paper addresses two
largely unexplored aspects in the existing literature on collusion between cost asymmetric
rms. We have derived three main results: (i) Without side payments, some collusion is
sustainable under cost asymmetry whenever collusion is sustainable under cost symmetry.
(ii) Without side payments, e¢ cient collusion is more di¢ cult when costs are asymmetric.
(iii) With side payments, cost asymmetries facilitate collusion. The key policy implica-
tion is that the feasibility of side payments between cartel members plays a particularly
important role when rms have asymmetric cost structures.
We characterize the maximum scope for collusion in the textbook model of Bertrand
competition under cost asymmetry. Interesting avenues for future research may be to
explicitly model the costs associated with disguising side transfers, or to use more general
cost sstructure to check the robustness of our results.
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A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Let n = 2, c1 < c2, and (p; s) 2 (c2; p) 1. Then, (p; s) 2
PO \  () if and only if
p = pO(s1); (12)
s11
 
pO(s1)
  (1  )1  p1m ; and (13)
s1  . (14)
The rst condition ensures that (p; s) 2 PO. The latter two conditions are the non-
deviation constraints (C1) and (C2) when substituting pO(s1) for p and using the fact
that pO(s1) 2 [pm1 ; pm2 ] for all s1 2 [0; 1].
Firm 1s per period prot s11
 
pO(s1)

is equal to 0 for s1 = 0 and equal to 1 (p1m)
for s1 = 1. Moreover, since @1@p < 0 for p > p
m
1 and
@pO
@s1
< 0, s11
 
pO(s1)

is strictly
increasing in s1 for all s1 2 [0; 1]. These observations imply that rm 1s non-deviation
constraint in (13) is satised if and only if
s1  bs1 () ; (15)
where the one-to-one correspondence bs1 () : (0; 1) ! (0; 1) is implicitly dened by the
following condition:28
bs1 ()1  pO(bs1 ()) = (1  )1  p1m . (16)
It is easy to see that lim!0 bs1 () = 1, lim!1 bs1 () = 0, and @bs1@ < 0 for all  2 (0; 1).
There therefore exists a unique b such that
bs1 b = b. (17)
Since 1 (p1m) > 1
 
pO(s1)

for all s1 2 [0; 1), it follows from the denition of bs1 () in
(16) that bs1 () > 1   for all  2 (0; 1). It directly follows that the threshold b as dened
by condition (17) exceeds 1
2
: b > 1
2
:
28Indeed, bs1() is closely related to the lower bound on rm 1s market share derived in section 4.1:
bs1() = es1  pO( ; ):
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Now suppose  < b. Then, since @bs1
@
< 0,
bs1 () > :
Hence, conditions (15) and (14) are incompatible, which implies that PO \  () = ?.
If   b, on the other hand, then bs1 ()  . In this case, PO \  () is non-empty
and contains all allocations (p; s) 2 (c2; p)1 such that p = pO(s1) and s1 2 [bs1 () ; ].
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: Let n = 2 and c1 < c2. Dene the payo¤ functions Vi(p; s1)
for i = 1; 2 as follows:
V1(p; s1)  s11(p);
V2(p; s1)  (1  s1)2(p):
Then, the set of sustainable allocations  () consists of all (p; s) 2 (c2; p)1 such that
the following two non-deviation conditions are satised:
V1(p; s1)  (1  )1 (min [p; pm1 ]) ; (18)
V2(p; s1)  (1  )2 (min [p; pm2 ]) : (19)
An allocation (p; s) 2 
() if and only if (p; s) 2  () and there does not exist any
(p0; s0) 2  () such that Vi (p0; s0)  Vi(p; s) for all i 2 f1; 2g and Vi (p0; s0) > Vi(p; s) for
at least one i 2 f1; 2g.
Obviously, if (p; s) 2  ()\PO, i.e. if (p; s) is an unconstrained Pareto optimum and
sustainable for discount factor , then (p; s) 2 
().
For all V 2 (0; 1(pm1 )), dene the contour sets of rm 1s payo¤ as29
C (V )  f(p; s1) j s1 = (p;V ); p 2 [min fp j 1(p)  V g ;max fp j 1(p)  V g]g ;
where
(p;V )  V
1(p)
:
Suppose that (ep; es) 2  () for the remainder of this proof, and let eV  V1 (ep; es1).
Then, es1 = (ep; eV ) 2 (0; 1) and (ep; es1) 2 C eV . Now consider any
29Assumption A3 implies that for any V 2 (0; 1(pm1 )) there exists a unique min fp j 1(p)  V g 2
(c1; p
m
1 ) and a unique max fp j 1(p)  V g 2 (pm1 ; p), and that 1(p) > V for all p 2
(min fp j 1(p)  V g ;max fp j 1(p)  V g). Note also that if (p; s1) 2 C (V ), then s1 2 (0; 1].
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p0 2
h
min
n
p j 1(p)  eV o ;maxnp j 1(p)  eV oi.30 Then, p; (p; eV ) 2 C eV  for
all p between ep and p0, and
V2

p0; (p0; eV )  V2 (ep; es1) = Z p0ep dV2dp

p; (p; eV ) dp; (20)
where
dV2
dp
(p; (p; eV )) = (1  (p; eV ))02(p)   (p; eV )01(p)1(p)

| {z }
=0(p;eV )
2(p): (21)
Recall from section 4.2.1 that for any s1 2 [0; 1],
pO(s1) : (1  s1)02(pO(s1)) =  s1
01(p
O(s1))
1(pO(s1))
2(p
O(s1)): (22)
Since pO(s1) 2 [pm1 ; pm2 ] for all s1 2 [0; 1], and i(p) is strictly concave with maximizer pmi ,
the following inequalitites, which will play a key role in the remainder of this proof, hold:
dV2
dp
(p; (p; eV )) < 0 if p > pO((p; eV )); (23)
dV2
dp
(p; (p; eV )) > 0 if p < pO((p; eV )): (24)
We rst show that if es1 =  and pm1  ep < pO(), then (ep; es) 2 
 (). Suppose not.
Then there exists an allocation (p0; s0) 2  () that Pareto-dominates (ep; es) for the rms.
First, it is easy to see that p0 < ep. Since pm1  ep, 1(p0)  1(ep) if p0  ep. Moreover,
(p0; s0) 2  () implies that s01  , otherwise rm 2s non-deviation constraint would be
violated. Therefore, V1(p0; s01) < V1(ep; es1) if p0  ep and (p0; s0) 6= (ep; es). Suppose therefore
that p0 < ep. Next, we show that for any p 2 [p0; ep], p < pO((p; eV )). The concavity
of 1 implies that 1 (p)  min [1 (p0) ; 1 (ep)]. It follows from this that (p; eV )  :
s01  es1 = , otherwise rm 2s non-deviation constraint would be violated at (p0; s0), and
(p; eV ) = eV
1(p)
= es1 1(ep)1(p)  V1(p0;s01)1(p) = s01 1(p0)1(p) by the requirement that (p0; s0) Pareto-
dominates (ep; es). As pO() is decreasing, (p; eV )   implies that pO()  pO((p; eV )).
Finally, since ep < pO(), we can conclude that for any p 2 [p0; ep], p < pO((p; eV )).
From (24) it then follows that dV2
dp

p; (p; eV ) > 0 for all p 2 [p0; ep]. Since p0 < ep, this
implies that
R p0ep dV2dp (p; (p)) dp < 0, so that, by (20), V2 p0; (p0; eV ) < V2 (ep; es1). Since
V1 (p
0; s01)  V1 (ep; es1) only if s01  (p0; eV1) and @V2@s1 < 0, this implies that V2 (p0; s01) <
V2 (ep; es1), so that we have a contradiction. Hence, (ep; es) 2 
 ().
30Since es1 2 (0; 1), 1 (ep) > eV . The set hminnp j 1(p)  eV o ;maxnp j 1(p)  eV oi hence inludes
prices both above and below ep.
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To prove the statement of the proposition, all that remains to be done is to exclude
(ep; es) that are neither in PO nor such that es1 =  and pm1  ep < pO() from 
 (). Let us
distinguish between three di¤erent cases:
Case 1: ep < pm1
It is straightforward to see that (ep; es) =2 
() in this case. First, (pm1 ; es) 2  (): the
non-deviation constraints for collusion boil down to 1     es1   at both allocations.
Second, Vi(pm1 ; es) > Vi(p; es) for i = 1; 2.
Case 2: ep > pO(es1)
In this case, (23) implies that a Pareto-improvement for the rms can be achieved
locally by means of a small price decrease coupled with a marginal change in market
shares so as to keep rm 1s payo¤ constant. Since i(min [p; pmi ]) is non-decreasing in p
for i = 1; 2, such a Pareto-improvement can be achieved without leading to a violation of
the non-deviation constraints, that is, within  (). We conclude that (ep; es) =2 
().
Case 3: pm1  ep < pO(es1), es1 < 
In this case, by (24), the rms can achieve a Pareto-improvement locally by means of
a marginal price increase coupled with a marginal increase in rm 1s market share so as
to keep rm 1s payo¤ constant. Such a Pareto-improvement can be achieved within the
set  (). First, rm 2s non-deviation constraint, which is es1   at (ep; es), remains slack
by continuity: es1 <  by assumption and (p; eV ) is continuous in p. Second, since pm1  ep,
rm 1s deviation prot is una¤ected by a marginal price increase. Hence, (ep; es) =2 
().
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: Let p 2 (c2; p). Recall that
e(p) = Pi2A(p) i(min[p;pmi ])i(p)   1P
i2A(p)
i(min[p;pmi ])
i(p)
:
If ci = c1 for all i 2 A(p), then i(p) = 1(p) for all i 2 A(p). Hence, e(p) = eT (p).
If ci > c1 for some i 2 A(p), however, then i(p) < 1(p) for some i 2 A(p), while still
i(p)  1(p) for all i 2 A(p). Hence,
P
i2A(p)
i(min[p;p
m
i ])
1(p)
<
P
i2A(p)
i(min[p;p
m
i ])
i(p)
, which
implies that eT (p) < e(p). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: Let n = 2 and c1 < c2. Denote by T () the set of sustainable
stationary collusive outcomes with side payments:
T ()  (p; S) 2 (c2; p)1 j (Di) holds for i = 1; 2	 :
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Similarly, denote by 
T () the Pareto-e¢ cient subset of T () that we seek to char-
acterize. (p; S) 2 
T () if and only if (p; S) 2 T () and there does not exist any
(p0; S 0) 2 T () that Pareto-dominates (p; S) for the rms.
It is easy to the see that 
T () never includes any outcomes with p > pm1 . First, if any
given outcome (p; S) with p > pm1 belongs to 
T (), then also (pm1 ; S) 2 T (). Second,
Si1 (p
m
1 ) > Si1 (p) for all i and for any vector S.
Moreover, no outcome (p; S) 2 T () such that p < pm1 and (D2) is slack can belong to

T (). This is because if, given , (D2) is slack at (p; S), then, by continuity, (D2) is also
satised at (p+ "; S) for su¢ ciently small " > 0. Moreover, if (D1) is satised at (p; S),
then, for any " 2 (0; pm1   p], (D1) is also satised at (p+ "; S). However, 01 (p) > 0 for
all p < pm1 , which implies that for any " 2 (0; pm1   p], Si1 (p+ ") > Si1 (p) for all i.
Hence, if (p; S) 2 
T (), then either p = pm1 , or p < pm1 and (D2) is binding.
If   eT (pm1 ), then T () contains some unconstrained Pareto-e¢ cient outcomes.
Obviously, if an unconstrained Pareto-e¢ cient outcome is sustainable, i.e. if (p; S) 2
T () and p = pm1 , then (p; S) 2 
T ().
For the remainder of this proof, consider any
ep; eS 2 T () and any  2 (0; 1) such
that
c2 < ep < pm1
and (D2) is binding: eS1 = 1  (1  ) 2 (ep)
1 (ep) :
Let us examine whether there exists any outcome in T () that Pareto-dominates
ep; eS.
At any alternative outcome with p < ep, at least one of the rms must be worse o¤, since the
total prie 1 (p) is smaller than 1 (ep).31 Hence, to check whether ep; eS is a constrained
Pareto-optimum or not, we only need to consider alternative outcomes with prices aboveep.
This implies that if there are no outcomes with p > ep in T (), that is, if  = eT (ep),32
then
ep; eS 2 
T (). This latter observation implies that whenever  < eT (pm1 ), then 
pU () ; SU1 ; 1  SU1
 2 
T (), where pU () denotes the highest sustainable price, uniquely
dened by eT  pU () = , and SU1 = 1  (1  ) 2(pU ())1(pU ()) .
Therefore, let us focus on the case  > eT (ep) from now onwards, and consider only
alternative outcomes with prices above ep. In fact, we can also restrict attention to alter-
31Obviously, rm 1 would also earn a lower payo¤ at any alternative outcome that has p = ep.
32Recall that if c1 < c2, then eT (p) is strictly increasing for all p 2 (c2; p).
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native outcomes with prices at most equal to pm1 : if, given , there exists a sustainable
outcome with a price strictly above pm1 that Pareto-dominates
ep; eS, then there also
exists a sustainable outcome with price pm1 that Pareto-dominates
ep; eS.
It is easy to see that moving from
ep; eS to an alternative outcome (p0; S 0) 2 T ()
with p0 2 (ep; pm1 ] always benets rm 2: rst, 1 (p0) > 1 (ep), and second, 1 S 01 > 1  eS1,
since rm 2s non-deviation constraint becomes more di¢ cult to satisfy as p increases (as
is easy to check, 2(p)
1(p)
is increasing in p in the relevant range). The question is hence
whether there exists an alternative outcome (p0; S 0) 2 T () at which rm 1 earns higher
prots than at
ep; eS. ep; eS 2 
T () if and only if the answer to this question is no.
For any  and p such that   eT (p), rm 1s equilibrium (per-period) payo¤ is
maximal if S1 is as large as possible, i.e. if (D2) is binding. Firm 1s maximal collusive
payo¤ as a function of p 2 (c2; pm1 ] given  is thus equal to
1(p; )  1 (p)  (1  )2 (p) :
The derivative of 1(p; ) with respect to p is

0
1(p; ) = 
0
1 (p)  (1  )02 (p) :
Clearly:
d
0
1(p; )
d
= 02 (p) > 0:
This implies that for every p 2 (c2; pm1 ] there exists a unique b(p)  1  01(p)02(p) such that

0
1(p;
b(p)) = 0,

0
1(p; ) < 0 if  < b(p), and 01(p; ) > 0 if  > b(p). It is straightforward to check that
@b(p)
@p
> 0() 2 [D0 (p)]2 > D(p)D00(p): (25)
Moreover, b(pm1 ) = 1 and limp!c2 b(p) 2 (0; 1).
Assuming that (25) holds, we can conclude the following. If  > limp!c2 b(p), then
there exists a unique pL () 2 (c2; pm1 ) such that 
0
1(p; ) > 0 if and only if p < p
L ().
If   limp!c2 b(p) instead, then 01(p; ) < 0 for all p 2 (c2; pm1 ]. In the latter case, let
pL () = c2.
The implications of this are as follows:
If ep < min pL () ; pU (), then the rms can achieve a Pareto-improvement within
the set of sustainable outcomes: the outcome (p0; S 0) dened by p0 = min

pL () ; pU ()

31
and S 01 = 1   (1  ) 2(p0)1(p0) is sustainable and yields higher payo¤s than
ep; eS for both
rms.
If ep  pL (), on the other hand, then ep; eS 2 
T (): any outcome in T () with a
price above ep yields lower prots than ep; eS for rm 1, and as argued above, any outcome
with a price below ep must yield a lower payo¤ for at least one of the rms. Hence, no
Pareto-improvement is achievable within T (). Q.E.D.
Proposition A1 Suppose that (stationary) collusion on some price p > c2 and associ-
ated market shares s can be supported by minmax punishments. Select any pP 2 [0; c1)
and T such that
(1  T )1(pP ) + T s11(p) = 0; (26)
and let " 2 [0; c1   pP ].
Then the following punishment strategies minmax deviators and, together with the
initial collusive path, form a subgame perfect equilibrium:
 Upon any deviation by rm 1, the sequence of prices and market shares starting
from the rst period after the deviation t = 1 is as follows:h 
pP ; pP + "; :::; pP + "

; (1; 0; :::; 0)
	T
t=1
; f(p; :::; p); sg1t=T+1
i
:
 Upon any deviation by a rm i 6= 1, rms revert to the one-shot Bertrand equilibrium
with market price c2 from the rst period after the deviation onwards.
Proof. First note that s1 > 0, otherwise rm 1 could protably deviate from sta-
tionary collusion on price p > c2 and associated market shares s, even if the ensuing
punishment is maximal for rm 1. Since c1 > 0, there then always exist pP 2 [0; c1) and
T such that (26) holds.
The proposed punishments minmax deviators by construction. First, by (26) rm 1s
punishment leaves zero continuation prots to 1. Second, any rm i 6= 1 earns zero prots
in every period of is punishment.
It remains to establish that the proposed strategy prole is indeed credible. For this
we need to show that no rm has an incentive to deviate from any punishment at any
stage and be punished in turn. As usual, it su¢ ces to consider one-shot deviations.33
33By the one-shot deviation principle, "a strategy prole is subgame perfect if and only if there are no
protable one-shot deviations" (proposition 2.2.1 in Mailath and Samuelson (2006)).
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It is straightforward that no rm has an incentive to deviate from the punishment of
any rm i 6= 1: no rm can make a short-term gain by deviating from a static equilibrium,
and a deviation starts a minmax punishment for the deviator.
To show that no rm has a strict incentive to deviate from 1s punishment, it is
su¢ cient to consider deviations at t = 1. Clearly, no rm has an incentive to deviate for
t > T if the proposed punishment strategies are indeed credible, since by assumption the
collusive path can be supported by minmax punishments. Also, a rm has no incentive to
deviate in any period t 2 [2; T ] if it has no incentive to deviate at t = 1: The short-term
gains from a deviation are the same at any stage t 2 [1; T ], whereas the cost of foregoing
the future switch to collusion increases with t.
Firm 1s best possible deviation from its own punishment at t = 1 is to charge a price
above pP + " to earn zero instead of negative prots in the rst period. This deviation
would trigger the restart of rm 1s punishment with zero continuation prots. The rm
is hence indi¤erent between complying and deviating optimally.
A rm i 6= 1 cannot benet by deviating from 1s punishment at t = 1 either: a devi-
ation could not generate any short-term benet but would nonetheless trigger a minmax
punishment for rm i. Moreover, the assumption that the collusive path is sustainable
by minmax punishments trivially implies that all rms earn non-negative prots in the
carrot phase of rm 1s punishment. Hence, no rm i 6= 1 wants to deviate from 1s
punishment:
0 +   0 = 0  0 + T sii(p):
Proposition A2 If () = ?, i.e. if no stationary outcome with a market price strictly
above c2 can be supported in a subgame perfect equilibrium, then in any subgame perfect
equilibrium rm 1s normalized discounted payo¤ lies in [0; 1 (c2)], and the sum of dis-
counted payo¤s of any rm i 2 f2; :::; ng is equal to 0.
Proof. Let B = fi 2 f1; :::; ng j ci  c2g, and denote by bn 2 [2; n] the number of rms
with marginal costs at most equal to c2, that is, the number of elements of B. Then, as
follows directly from the analysis in section 4.1, () = ? if and only if  < bn 1bn .
Consider any path fP tg1t=0. Let pt  min fptigni=1 and ep  sup fptg1t=0. Since pti 2 (0; p)
for all i and all t, a nite ep exists.
Suppose that  < bn 1bn and that ep > c2. For the path fP tg1t=0 to be supported as
a subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome, with the associated sequence of market sharing
33
rules fst ()g1t=0, it is necessary that the following non-deviation condition holds in every
period t and for every i 2 B:,
1X
T=t
T tsTi
 
P T

i(p
T
i )  i
 
min

pt; pmi

: (27)
As sti (P
t) = 0 if pti 6= pt, (27) implies that
1X
T=t
T tsTi
 
P T

i(p
T )  i
 
min

pt; pmi

: (28)
Since i(p)  i(min [p; pmi ]) for any t, it follows from (28) that
1X
T=t
T tsTi
 
P T

i(min

pT ; pmi

)  i
 
min

pt; pmi

: (29)
Moreover, since i(min [p; pmi ]) is non-decreasing in p, we have i(min [p
t; pmi ])  i(min [ep; pmi ])
for all i and all t. (29) hence implies that
1X
T=t
T tsTi
 
P T

i(min [ep; pmi ])  i  min pt; pmi  : (30)
From ep > c2 it follows that i(min [ep; pmi ]) > 0 for all i 2 B. Therefore, (30) is equivalent
to 1X
T=t
T tsTi
 
P T
  i (min [pt; pmi ])
i(min [ep; pmi ]) : (31)
Summing over all i 2 B and noting that Pi2B sTi  P T   1 for all T yields
1
1   
X
i2B
i (min [p
t; pmi ])
i(min [ep; pmi ]) . (32)
The right-hand side of (32) can be made arbitrarily close to bn by choosing t appropriately.
However,  < bn 1bn if and only if 11  < bn. There must hence be contradiction of (32) for
some t. We can conclude that if  < bn 1bn , then no subgame perfect equilibrium has pt > c2
in any period t.
Thus, if () = ?, then on any subgame perfect equilibrium path sti (P t)i(pti) 
max fi(c2); 0g in every period t and for all i. Firm 1s normalized discounted equilibrium
payo¤ therefore cannot exceed 1(c2) and the normalized discounted payo¤ of any rm
i 2 f2; :::; ng is as most 0. Finally, no rm can be forced down to a normalized discounted
payo¤ below the rms minmax, which is 0 here, on any equilibrium path.
34
References
[1] Abreu, D.: Extremal Equilibria of Oligopolistic Supergames. Journal of Economic
Theory 39, 191-225 (1986)
[2] Abreu, D.: Towards a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games. Econometrica 56,
383-396 (1988)
[3] Athey, S. and Bagwell, K.: Optimal Collusion with Private Information. Rand Jour-
nal of Economics 32(3), 428-465 (2001)
[4] Athey, S. and Bagwell, K.: Collusion with Persistent Cost Shocks. Econometrica,
forthcoming (2006)
[5] Bae, H.: A Price-Setting Supergame between Two Heterogeneous Firms. European
Economic Review 31, 1159-1171 (1987)
[6] Bain, J. S.: Output quotas in imperfect cartels. Quarterly Journal of Economics 62,
617-622 (1948)
[7] Bernheim, B. D. and Whinston, M. D.: Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behav-
iour. Rand Journal of Economics 21(1), 1-26 (1990)
[8] Blume, A.: Bertrand without fudge. Economics Letters 78, 167-168 (2003)
[9] Collie, D. R.: Sustaining Collusion with Asymmetric Costs, Cardi¤ Business School
working paper (2004)
[10] Compte, O., Jenny, F., Rey, P.: Capacity Constraints, Mergers and Collusion. Euro-
pean Economic Review 46, 1-29 (2002)
[11] Cramton, P. C. and Palfrey, T. R.: Cartel Enforcement with Uncertainty about
Costs. International Economic Review 31, 17-47 (1990)
[12] Davidson, C. and Denerecke, R.: Excess Capacity and Collusion. International Eco-
nomic Review 31(3), 521-541 (1990)
[13] Dechenaux, E. and Kovenock, D.: Endogenous Rationing, Price Dispersion, and
Collusion in Capacity Constrained Supergames. Krannert Graduate School of Man-
agement, Purdue University, working paper no. 1164 (2003)
35
[14] Deneckere, R.J. and Kovenock, D.: Capacity-constrained price competition when
unit costs di¤er. CMSEMS discussion paper No. 861, Northwestern University, 1989
[15] Deneckere, R.J. and Kovenock, D.: Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly with unit cost
asymmetry. Economic Theory 8, 1-25 (1996)
[16] European Commission: Commission Fines Five Companies in Citric Acid Cartel.
Press Release, December 5, 2001
[17] European Commission: Commission Fines Five Companies in Sodium Gluconate
Cartel. Press Release, March 19, 2002
[18] Gilo, D., Spiegel, Y., Moshe, Y.: Partial Cross Ownership and Tacit Collusion.
Mimeo, Tel Aviv University, (2004)
[19] Hammond, S. D.: Caught in the Act: Inside an International Cartel. Department of
Justice (2005)
[20] Harrington, J. E. Jr.: The Determination of Price and Output Quotas in a Hetero-
geneous Cartel. International Economic Review 32(4), 767-792 (1991)
[21] Ivaldi, M., Rey, P., Seabright, P., Tirole, J.: The Economics of Tacit Collusion. IDEI
Working Paper n. 186, Report for DG Competition, European Commission, (2003)
[22] Jehiel, P.: Product di¤erentiation and price collusion. International Journal of In-
dustrial Organization 10, 633-641 (1992)
[23] Kihlstrom, R. and Vives, X.: Collusion by Asymmetrically Informed Firms. Journal
of Economics and Management Strategy 1, 371-396 (1992)
[24] Lambson, V. E.: Optimal Penal Codes in Price-setting Supergames with Capacity
Constraints. Review of Economic Studies 54, 385-297 (1987)
[25] Lambson, V. E.: Some Results on Optimal Penal Codes in Asymmetric Bertrand
Supergames. Journal of Economic Theory 62, 444-468 (1994)
[26] Lambson, V. E.: Optimal Penal Codes in Nearly Symmetric Bertrand Supergames
with Capacity Constraints. Journal of Mathematical Economics 24(1), 1-22 (1995)
[27] Mailath, G. J., and Samuelson, L. S.: Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run
Relationship. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2006
36
[28] McA¤ee, R. P. and McMillan J.: Bidding Rings. American Economic Review 82(3),
579-599 (1992)
[29] Pesendorfer, M.: A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions. Review of Economic
Studies 67(3), 281-411 (2000)
[30] Porter, R. H.: Detecting Collusion. Review of Industrial Organization 26, 147-167
(2005)
[31] Roberts, K.: Cartel Behaviour and Adverse Selection. Journal of Industrial Eco-
nomics 33, 401-413 (1985)
[32] Rothschild, R.: Cartel Stability when Costs are Heterogeneous. International Journal
of Industrial Organization 17, 717-734 (1999)
[33] Scherer, F. M.: Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance. Boston:
Houghton Mi­ in Company 1980
[34] Schmalensee, R.: Competitive Advantage and Collusive Equilibria. International
Journal of Industrial Organization 5, 351-368 (1987)
[35] Tirole, J.: The Theory of Industrial Organization. Cambridge: MIT Press 1988
[36] Vasconcelos, H.: Tacit Collusion, Cost Asymmetries, and Mergers. Rand Journal of
Economics 36(1), 39-62 (2005)
37
